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1  Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this paper is to review the structure and impact of the structural adjustment policies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and find a set of future policy prescriptions. The failure of SAPs for the 
most part can be traced to the dogmatic pursuit of inappropriate policies  derived from an 
inadequate theoretical framework by the IFIs. However, failures of governance in Africa have also 
been significant factors. An alternative set of SAPs and a new partnership between donors, trade 
partners and the Sub-Saharan African economies are proposed as part of a coherent development 
strategy based on Sen’s concept of capabilities enhancement. 
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3  Introduction 
Economic Justice and Africa 
  The continent of Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, faces a dire economic struggle.
1 
Over the last decade in particular the living conditions for the great majority of the people there 
have deteriorated. Economic growth is stagnant or even negative in many cases. The environment 
has also deteriorated. Inequality and poverty among the population have increased. All these are 
well-known facts -- acknowledged by both bilateral and multilateral donors of aid to Africa. Yet 
there seems to be a lack of vision from which arises a lack of determination in helping the poor, 
indebted African nations in their struggle against underdevelopment. What has brought about this 
paralysis of policy? 
  In the following section I discuss the so-called “Washington Consensus” which seems to 
be dictating much of the current policy gestures towards Africa and other poor indebted countries 
in the third world.  The indebted African countries are forced to swallow the bitter medicine of 
structural adjustment regardless of their economic and human conditions.
2 The direct and indirect 
costs of these policies on the vulnerable groups are already evident. We must ask if there is an 
alternative to the current combination of structural adjustment prescribed by the multilateral 
organizations on the one hand and the neo-isolationist retreat on the economic front by the U.S. on 
the other. 
  According to the recent advances in the theory of human development the goal of 
development is to enhance the scope of real freedom of individuals.  Economists and philosophers 
such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have proposed that the enhancement of the 
capabilities of the people -- their freedom to be and to do, to live their lives fully -- must be the 
4  ultimate goal of development.
3 UNDP has published several volumes of Human Development 
Reports to alert the international community about the achievements and shortfalls in all the 
countries in this regard. Once again, measured by these indicators, the plight of African countries 
would appear to call for urgent international action. 
  It can not be overemphasized that this is fundamentally an issue of global justice. Ignoring 
the serious conditions of economic deprivation in Africa and elsewhere in the world only declares 
our own complicity in an international regime of injustice. The call for an economic partnership 
with Africa, therefore, is at the bottom a call for economic justice. 
  But even if we all can agree about the ethics of the situation, what kind of alternative 
economic policies towards Africa are necessary? And, the skeptics might say, is it realistic to 
advocate an alternative set of policies? 
  The burden of this monograph is to show clearly that what is morally and economically 
necessary to do in this case can also be defended for its realism. To allow African economies to 
sink into a morass of dependent stagnation is not ultimately good for the World Economy. It is also 
not in the best interests of the U.S. to allow this to happen. 
  The argument is carried on in several stages. In the first section the received view 
(called ’the Washington Consensus’) regarding the African adjustment (as well as elsewhere) is 
critically reviewed. Next, the debt and human condition in sub-Saharan Africa are reviewed. Not 
surprisingly, this reveals the glaring inconsistencies between present domestic and international 
policy regimes and the real needs of the African people. In light of these discrepancies an 
alternative structural adjustment program more in keeping with the human development goals of 
Africa is outlined. The alternative program has deep economic and moral basis in enhancing the 
5  capabilities and real freedom of the African citizens.
4
  The final part of this monograph explores policy options for the U.S. with respect to Africa 
in the sphere of international economic relations. It turns out that ignoring Africa or following a 
policy of ’selective isolationism’ is not a viable option for the U.S. in the next century.  
Realistically, the U.S. must forge a new partnership with Africa based on trust, mutual respect and 
responsible economic behavior. A set of specific recommendations consistent with the principle 
of enhancing the economic freedom and social capabilities of the African people concludes the 




The “Washington Consensus” Travels to Africa 
The “Washington Consensus” 
  “Washington Consensus” is the name given to the complex array of policy reforms 
underway in the developing countries.  John Williamson
5 can be credited with coining this aptly descriptive 
term.  Although, as Williamson
6 tells us he "...should have christened this list the 'universal convergence' rather 
than the 'Washington consensus,' on the grounds that there is no complete consensus, while the very real 
convergence extends far beyond Washington...."  The impact of this so-called "Washington consensus" on the 
world economy is already considerable.  But what is this consensus about which not everyone agrees?  In the 
appendix to his excellent 1994 paper Williamson provides us with a list that without being exhaustive covers a 
great deal of the policy terrain.  In my view, this list is as good a place to begin the discussion on structural 
adjustment as any other.  I have reorganized the list to reflect (roughly) the priorities that African economies have 
6  been asked to accord to the various components of the consensus.  However, the ordering is definitely not 
lexicographical and does not apply completely to any particular country. 
 
(1)   Privatization: Ways and means must be found for state enterprises to be privatized.  A soft version 
advocates caution and gradual privatization.  A hard core neoliberal version advocates "shock treatment" 
in the form of rapid and wholesale privatization. 
 
(2)  Deregulation: In keeping with the tenets of (an almost) perfectly competitive market structure, 
governments should abolish regulations that get in the way of new firms entering the market.  All 
regulations that restrict competition in any way should be abolished. 
 
(3)  Property rights: Through a set of legal and institutional reforms private property rights must be secured by 
law. 
 
(4)  Financial liberalization: The ultimate goal of deregulation and privatization of the financial sector is to 
achieve free market interest rates.  Williamson adds judiciously, "...experience has shown that, under 
conditions of a chronic lack of confidence, market-determined rates can be so high as to threaten the 
financial solvency of productive enterprises and government.  Under that circumstance a sensible interim 
objective is the abolition of preferential interest rates for privileged borrowers and achievement of a 
moderately positive real interest rate."
7
 
(5) Trade  liberalization:  Here the GATT philosophy and procedures are advocated.  As Williamson puts it, 
"Quantitative trade restrictions should be rapidly replaced by tariffs, and these should be progressively 
reduced until a uniform low tariff in the range of 10 per cent (or at most 20 per cent) is achieved.  There is, 
however, some disagreement about the speed with which tariffs should be reduced (with 
recommendations falling in a band between 3 and 10 years), and about whether it is advisable to slow 




(6)  Foreign direct investment: Barriers to entry by the foreign firms should be removed.  This is intended to 
increase the capital in-flow to the African economies. 
 
(7)  Fiscal discipline: This is often seen as the heart of reforming the government sector.
9  According to 
Williamson, "Budget deficits, properly measured to include those of provincial governments, state 
enterprises, and the central bank, should be small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation 
tax.  This typically implies a primary surplus (i.e., before adding debt service to expenditure) of several per 
cent of GDP, and an operational deficit (i.e., disregarding that part of the interest bill that simply 




(8) Public  expenditure  priorities: Hand in hand with the fiscal discipline of the governments goes the task of 




The Washington Consensus and the Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa 
  Many of these prescriptions also form the core of the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) recommended 
by the IMF.  The reader is referred to Appendix 1 for a description of SAPs and a mathematical formalization of 
the IMF financial programming model. 
 
  Although neither the Washington consensus nor the IMF model is used as a complete blueprint for actual 
policy formulation, more often than not they represent the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the analysis 
underlying most policies for African economies. Given the complexities of the actual African economies and the 
often confusing nature of the policy statements by the government officials in these countries the 
Washington-consensus and the IMF approach both have at least the virtues of clarity and consistency.  However, 
the most significant question to ask is how appropriate are these policy approaches to the real problems of 
stagnation, poverty and environmental decay in Africa?  In order to answer this question fully we need to know 
something about the problems faced by the African economies.  In particular, in this monograph I wish to focus on 
the problems of low-income African economies where the problems of indebtedness and sustainable development 




African Debt and Bleak Prospects for Sustainable Development 
The Marginalization of Africa 
8    Recently (5-8 August, 1996) twenty five African NGO networks met in Harare to discuss 
the African development situation. These groups represent a wide-ranging spectrum of 
development philosophies.  Most of them also have grass-roots connections. Their conclusions 
regarding the prospects for African development under the currently prevailing conditions, if 
accurate, are truly alarming.  According to the NGO groups: 
The African continent continues to be marginalized in the new world order. It remains 
characterized on the international scene as a basket case stricken with unresolvable poverty, 
conflict and debt. At the same time, the shaping of development policy, practice and pace 
is driven by the interests of Trans-National Corporations and dominated by new 
instruments of global governance such as the World Trade Organization and International 
Financial Institutions. These are dominated by the North at the expense of Africa’s voice. 
The international community lacks the moral and political will to constructively assist 
Africa with its dilemmas. It is therefore a matter of grave concern that, in spite of their best 
efforts, African institutions have not adequately played their role in defining an agenda for 
African development, in articulating African interests and in harnessing resources and 
capacities for action. 
 
  At the national level, African governments have excluded people in the policy and 
decision making processes. In particular, women, who are the socio-economic mainstay of 
the continent, have been totally marginalized. The exclusion of the population has blocked 
the emergence of endogenous initiatives. This is aggravated by the failure of education and 
information systems to nurture positive and creative thought to address African problems 




  The charges above are serious enough to merit a thorough investigation in the African 
context. It is also necessary to understand the deeper reasons for the African decline and the 
consequent “Afro-pessimism” that is in vogue nowadays.
12
 
Economic Conditions in Africa 
  Table 1 presents the growth record of the African countries during the decade of the 80's. 
It is clear that the growth performance of all the countries has been quite weak. What is indeed 
9  alarming is that the weakest economies that were called upon to adjust most strongly by the IMF 
and the World Bank are precisely the ones registering a negative growth rate during the decade. 
 
Table 1 
Growth of GDP in Africa, 198O-1987 (constant 198O U.S. dollars, market prices, in percent) 
 
     P e r i o d  
  Country    1980-  1981-  1982-  1983-  1984-  1985-  1986-  1980 
  Groups   81  82  83  84  85  86  87  1987 
                              A v e r .  
 
  Strong 
  adjusting  -3.01  0.33  -3.85  -4.31  6.33  2.82  -1.97  -0.53 
 
  Weak 
  adjusting  5.44  3.46  0.66  -1.29  0.13  4.01  1.88  2.00 
 
  Non-          .  
  adjusting  3.92  3.35  3.53  3.68  6.40  3.62  -2.51  3.50 
 
  Sub-Saharan 
  Africa   -1.05  1.01  -2.37  -2.94  5.44  3.09  -1.48  0.24 
 
  North 
  I Africa  -  2.27  3.12  3.63  2.78  1.90  0.19  1.29  1.50 
 
 
  Africa 
  Total    -1.52  1.81  -0.06  -0.66  3.98  1.92  -0.38  0.73 
 
 
Source: World Bank data files; country coverage and classification of strong adjusting, weak 
adjusting and non-adjusting countries according to World Bank; Average annual growth rates were 




  Table 2 shows other summary performance indicators over the same decade. Again, the 
growth in export performance has been negative as has been the growth in real domestic 
10  investment. The saving rate, by world standards, is quite low. At the same time the growth in 
personal consumption has been negative. Therefore, it is not the profligacy of the ordinary people 
in Africa that can account for the low saving rate (although the affluent minority certainly has 
more than a few profligate members). The more likely explanation is the constraint of falling 
income and the burden of indebtedness. 
 
Table 2 




                                                                          
Countries not 
                                    All Countries                   affected by strong 
                                                                                shocks 
Period                  With strong         With weak         With strong 
  With weak 
                          reform                or no reform            reform      
                or no reform 
                          programs              programs             programs       
             programs 
 
Growth of GDP  1980-84    1.4    1.5    1.2    0.7 
(constant 1980  1985-37    2.8    2.7    3.8    1.5 
prices) 
 
Agricultural  1980-84    1.1    1.3    1.4    1.8 
production  1985-87    2.6    1.5    3.4    2.6 
 
Growth of   1980-84    -1.3(-11.0)  -3.1(-0.9)  -0.7(-4.7)  -5.7(-2.1) 
export volume  1985-87    4.2 (-2.0)  0 2(-2.5)    4.9( 3.5) 
  -3.3(-6.0) 
 
Growth of imp.  1985-87    1.7 (-7.7)  -2.7(-3.0)  6.1(7.4)    -4.o(-2ｷ2) 
volume excluding oil    4.8 (6.8) 
exporters 
 
Growth of real  1980-84    -8.1    -3 7    -3.5    -7.0 
domestic   1985-87    -0.9    -7 0    1.9    -4.8 
investment 
11   
Gross domestic  1982-84    9.9    2.3    7.8    0.9 
savings (%  1986-87    10.7    6.0    10.7    5.6 
of GDP) 
 
Growth of   1980-84    -2.3    -1.1    -2.4    -1.5 
per capita  1985-87    -0.4    -o.5    0.7    -o.9 
 
Note: Country coverage varies by indicator depending on available data over the entire period 
covered. Averages are unweighteid except as noted. Growth rates are computed using least squares. 
Periods are inclusive. Figures in parentheses are weighted averages of country growth rates based 
on total values summed across countries. 




  Turning now to African indebtedness the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular 
appears to be grave. Table 3 shows the debt records of this region. Over the last decade the 
absolute amount of debt service has shown mainly an upward trend. After 1986 there was some 
decline, but recent tendency is for the debt service burden to grow once again. The debt service 
ratio (ratio of debts to exports) stood at 278.4 for these very poor countries in 1990. Debt to GDP 
ratio for the same year was 107.7. It is impossible to envisage sustainable development with equity 
under such intolerable debt burden. 
 
Table 3 Sub-Saharan African Debt 
 
            Debt Service (DS)  DS to  Debt To   Debt  
  Years       (USS Billions)       Exports    Exports     to GDP 
 
  1978    3.5   10.0  102.3  24.3 
  1979    4.4   10.2  96.1  24.5 
  1980    6.2   10.8  85.0  23.5 
  1981    6.6   14.2  123.0  29.2 
  1982    6.8   17.8  177.2  34.4 
  1983    8.1   22.9  214.5  40.4 
  1984    10.2   26.9  207.7  41.9 
  1985    13.0   34.7  217.6  43.4 
12    1986    15.2   39.4  326.3  74.4 
  1987    8.5   23.8  365.9  101.1 
  1988    10.0   25.8  340.6  97.7 
  1989    9.4   20.3  299.9  108.0 
  1990    10.6   20.6  278.4  107.7 
 
*** 
Sources: Carol Lancaster and J. Williamson eds.,   African Debt and Financing 
(Washington, D.C. institute for international Economics, 1986), 28-46 and World Bank, World Debt Tables: 
External Debt of Developing Countries 1988-89 (Washington, D.C.:The World Bank, 1989). Note: The last five 
figures  marked  in  the  last  column  are  the  ratios  of  debt/GNP  instead  of  GDP.  1989  and  1990  figures  are  estimated 
and projected, respectively. 
 
 
  To make an already bad situation even worse the terms of trade have also declined for the 
African countries in the last decade. Table 4 displays the statistics for a number of African 
economies. If we assume a value of 100 for terms of trade in 1980 by 1988 all countries in the table 
show a decline to various degrees. Terms of trade is defined by the international economists as the 
ratio of export prices to prices of importables. Accordingly by the late 1980s some of the African 
countries on the table had to increase exports by more than 25% to import the same amount as in 
1980. If we add to this the debt service burden discussed above it is not surprising that investment 
and growth have declined for most of these countries steadily. 
 
Table 4 Terms of Trade Estimates for Selected African Countries 
(1980 = 100) 
 
  Country      1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
  
  Ghana      73  64  63  71  59  66  64  65 
  Kenya      93  92  88  92  91  91  73  72 
  Madagascar    84  82  88  102  103  110  83  81 
  Mozambique    103  89  85  101  94  90  83  87 
  Rwanda     68  67  63  68  71  70  52  53 
  SierraLeonc    90  90  93  98  97  99  89  90 
  Sudan      102  86  84  92  93  81  76  94 
  Cote d'Ivoire    90  71  83  80  78  73  74  82 
13    Ethiopia      71  77  76  87  82  123  69  76 
  The Gambia    114  91  89  115  117  94  85  82 
  Mauritania    99  105  103  97  96  91  87  86 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook- of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1989 
' Net barter terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the export unit value index to the import 
unit value index. 
 
 
  Table 5 shows the human development indexes (HDI) for selected African countries. This 
is intended to be a summary indicator of overall development performance. It takes into account 
not just growth (increased income) but also the effects of growth on the other human development 
aspects such as health and education. By this widely accepted measure most African countries are 
behind even poor developing economies such as Ecuador or Philippines. According to the 1996 
Human Development Report Ghana (rated by the World Bank as a recent 
 
Table 5: Human Development in Africa 
                                                                                    R e a l  
                                                                       R e a l       G D P  
                                                                       G D P         p e r  
                                                                       p er   capita 
                         HDI      HDI    capita   minus 
                         value    rank   rank     HDI 
                                                                                    r a n k  
  Zimbabwe    0.534  124  120  -3 
  Congo      0.517  125  101  -23 
  Kenya      0.473  128  136   9 
  Ghana      0.467  129  124  -4 
  Lesotho      0.464  130  150  21 
  Equatorial Guinea  0.461  131  126  -4 
  Zambia     0.411  136  144   9 
  Nigeria      0.401  137  134  -2 
  Zaire      0.371  141  174  33 
  Tanzania,     0.364  144  170   26 
  Sudan      0.359  146  138   -7 
  Cote d'lvoire    0.357  147  131   -15 
14    Central African Rep.  0.355  148  145   -2 
   Madagascar    0.349  150  164   14 
  Rwanda     0.332  152  161    9 
  Senegal      0.331  153  129   -23 
  Benin      0.327  154  130   -23 
  Uganda     0.327  155  151   -3 
  Malawi     0 321  157  163    6 
  Liberia      0.311  158  154   -3 
  Guinea     0.307  160  126   -33 
  Guinea-Bissau    0.297  161  152   -8 
  Gambia     0.292  162  142   -19 
  Chad      0 291  163  165    2 
  Djibouti      0.287  164  160   -4 
  Angola     0.283  165  166    1 
  Burundi      0 282  166  167    1 
  Mozambique    0.261  167  169    2 
  Ethiopia      0.237  168  173    5 
  Burkina Faso    0.225  170  l59  -11 
  Mali      0.223  171  172    1 
  Somalia      0.221  172  162  -10 
  Siera Leone    0 219  173  152  -20 
  Niger      0.204  174  157  -17 
Source: UNDP, HDR 1996 
 
 
success in Africa) scored 0.467 with an overall rank of 129 among 174 countries. The country to 
occupy the last rank was also an African country -- Niger with a value of 0.204 for its HDI index. 
The silver lining in this otherwise completely dark cloud is that over the last three decades 
Sub-Saharan African countries have slowly improved their human development record. However, 
this improvement while worthy of acknowledgment especially in the light of disastrous growth in 
the 80's has been at a snail’s pace. From 1980 to 1993 in particular the index increased from 0.312 
to 0.379 -- not a record of phenomenal upward trend. It should also be noted that countries, with 
only medium human development according to the UNDP had an average HDI of 0.647 for 1993 
-- more than twice that recorded for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  The decade of 1980's seems to have been really a lost decade for Sub-Saharan Africa in so 
15  far as economic development is concerned.  Over the entire decade GNP per capita fell by nearly 
10 percent. World prices for major exports -- tea, cocoa, coffee and cotton fell by an enormous 50 
percent. Real investment dropped by more than 50% in per capita terms. About 170 million people 
-- nearly a third of the region’s population -- do not receive an adequate amount of food. About 23 
million children are malnourished and 16% of the babies are underweight. The region also records 
the world’s highest maternal mortality rate -- 929 per 100,000 live births (compared with 33 for the 
OECD countries). 
 
Human Conditions in Africa and Sustainability 
  Table 6 shows the bleak trends in health and nutrition indicators in Africa. Under these 
circumstances the rhetoric of sustainable development may seem like a cruel joke and indeed 
under the current circumstances this assessment is not far from the truth.  However, as Khan and 
Sonko
13 have shown improvement of the environment can under some circumstances go hand in 
hand with an increase in equality and improvement of the standard of living of the poor people. 
Table 6: Trends in Some Health and Nutrition Indicators 
 
    I n f a n t   m o r t a l i t y   r a t e    D a i l y   c a l o r i e   s u p p l y  
    ( p e r   t h o u s a n d   l i v e   b i r t h s )   ( p e r   c a p i t a )  
  Country  . 
    ! 965  1989  Annual   1965  1986  Annual 
      c h a n g e   (%)      change (%) 
  1. Burundi    142  70  -2.9    2 311  2 253  -0.2 
  2. CH      157  100  -1.9    2 016  1 980  -0.1 
  3. Cote d'lvoire    119  92  -2.0    2 334  2 365  0.1 
  4. Ghana    120  86  -1 1    1 912  2 209  0.6 
  5. Kenya    112  68  -2.1    2 169  1 973  0.4 
  6. Madagascar    201  117  -2.2    2 375  2 101  -0.5 
  7. Malawi    200  It7  -1.3    2 196  2 009  -0.4 
  8. Mali      207  167  -0.9    1 113  2 111  0.7 
  9. Mauritania    171  123  1.5    1 796  2 528  1.5 
16    10. Mauritius    65  21  -4.6    2 212  2 679  0.1 
  11. Niger    I80  130  -1.4    1 930  2 340  0.1 
  12. Nigeria    166  100  -2.1    2166  2 039  -0.3 
  13. Senegal    160  82  -2.7    2 152  1 9B9  -0.9 
  14. Sierra Leone    208  149  -1.4    1 976  1 106  -O.4 
  15. Tanzania    138  112  -0.9    1 800  2 151  0.1 
  16. Togo    156  90  -2.3    2 345  2 133  -0.4 
  17. Uganda    121  99  -0.1    2 3t3  2 013  -0.7 
  I8. Zaire      141  94  -1.7    2135  2 034  -0.2 
  19. Zambia    121  76  -1.9    2 012  2 026  -0.03 
 




  1. Algeria    I54  69  -3.t    1 683  2 726  2.1 
  2. Botswana    112  39  -4.3    1 982  2 269  0.6 
  3. Burkina Faso    190  135  -1.4    1 841  2 061  0.5 
  4. Cameroon    143  90  -1.9    1 990  2 161  O.4 
5.  Ethiopia    165  133  -0.9    1 802  1 658  -0.4 
6.  Lesotho    142  96  -1.6    2 024  2 307  0.6 
  7 Morocco    145  69  -3.1    2 056  2 120  1.'4 
  8. Rwanda    141  111  -0.7    I 660  1 786  0.3 
 9   S w a z i l a n d       .   .  
  10. Tunisia    I45  46  -4.7    2150  2 964  -1.4 
  11. Sudan    160  104  -11    1 133  1 996  O.4 
  12. Zimbabwe    103  46  -3.3    2 044  2 232  0.4 
 
  Average      155  86  -2.5    1 916  2 271  0.7 
 
Source: Excerpted from World Development Report 
 
 
  Currently, Africa faces multiple ecological challenges. The most significant and 
threatening ones are: drought, deforestation, desertification and pollution. To this list one could 
add hazardous waste dumping and possibly global warming. 
  Drought is a typical feature of the Sahelian countries. In the late sixties the Sahel suffered 
one of the worst droughts in recorded history. Most affected were Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique 
and the Sudan. The more recent droughts have forced mass starvation. In 1985 it was estimated 
17  that more than 30 million people were in danger of starvation. More than 10 million people were 
forced to abandon their homes and lands because of the adverse conditions caused by the drought. 
  Deforestation is also an imminent threat to the economic security in Africa. In 1991 the 
U.N. report on Africa’s environment warned that deforestation was proceeding at the rate of 3.8 
million hectares per year. In Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 30% of the original rainforest has been 
degraded. In Nigeria, it is reported that more than 90% of its moist forests are already gone. Cote 
d’Ivoire has already destroyed two thirds of its forest even as it continues logging for exporting 
timber. 
  Poverty and deforestation are also linked by a vicious circle in Africa. The poor are forced 
to degrade the environment by cutting down trees for agriculture, livestock raising and in many 
cases for fire to cook their daily food. However, this in turn leads to lower opportunities for the 
poor and a long-term decline of their income earning potential.
14
  Closely related to deforestation is the threat of desertification. Aforementioned practices 
such as logging, overgrazing and the destruction of trees for firewood contribute to desertification. 
 In the long run, this will make agriculture totally unsustainable. 
  The primary cause of desertification, however, is the overcultivation of cash crops such as 
cotton, groundnuts and tobacco. Burkina Faso, for example, loses an area of 85,000 hectares each 
year due to its cultivation of groundnuts and other cash crops. Senegal loses about 50,000 hectares 
in the same way and Guinea Bissau degrades 20,000-35,000 hectares per year. A recent United 
Nations Environment Program and FAO study on soil erosion points out that about 23% of African 
land has been degraded. With the continuation of current trends in soil erosion African agricultural 
output could decline by 25% by the year of 2000. This is sobering news for a continent faced with 
18  many other human catastrophes already.
15
  To these severe ecological challenges one can add the threat to the health and well-being 
of people from the worsening of air and water quality and the increase in the dumping of hazardous 
wastes by some non-African countries on poor African lands. 
  Table 7 and 8 present the projections of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
regarding the carbon emission for the African countries. These tables, in a way, summarize the 
most serious danger due to deforestation and pollution in Africa. If one adds up all the various 
environmental threats outlined above the entire continent would seem to be advancing steadily 
towards ecological disaster. 
19  Table 7: Low Base Case Carbon Emission Projections for Deforestation of  
All Tropical Forests for 1980-2050 (in billion tunes of carbon per year) 
 
Countries  1980 2000 2025 2060 
AFRICA      
Algeria      
Angola  3.9 4.4 5.0 5.8 
Burundi      
Cameroon  11.0 12.6 14.1 15.8 
Cen.  Afr.  Rep.  2.5 2.9 3.3 3.8 
Chad  3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
Congo  2.4 2.7 3.1 3.4 
Equ.  Guinea  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Benin  1.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 
Mali  1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 
Tanzania  3.5 3.9 4.4 4.9 
Burkina  Faso  3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
Mozambique  5.0 5.8 6.3 7.1 
Niger  1.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 
Nigeria  23.4 28.6 29.9 33.3 
Guinea  1.8 2.1 2.4 2.6 
Rwanda  0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Uganda  1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Zambia  3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
Botswana  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Liberia  2.9 3.3 3.7 4.1 
Namibia  0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 
Ethiopia  5.6 6.3 7.1 7.9 
Gambia  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Ghana  3.8 4.3 4.8 5.4 
Guinea  3.9 4.4 5.0 5.6 
Kenya  1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 
Malawi  11.1 12.6 14.2 15.9 
Sierra  0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Ivory  Coast  41.4 46.9 53.0 59.1 
Madagascar 8.7  9.9  11.1  12.4 
Togo  0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Senegal  2.1 2.3 2.6 2.9 
Somalia  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Zimbabwe  3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
Gabon  1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Sudan  18.8 21.3 24.1 26.9 
Zaire  24.8 28.1 31.7 36.4 
TROPICAL 
AFRICA 
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Table 8: High Base Case: Net Flux from Population-based Rates of Forest Conversion  
and High Forest Biomass Estimates 
 
Countries  1980 2000 2025 2060 
AFRICA      
Algeria      
Angola 8.4  9.6  13.8  15.5 
Burundi      
Cameroon  23.7 27.4 39.2 46.9 
Cen.  Afr.  Rep.  5.6 6.3 9.0 10.8 
Chad 6.4  7.4  10.6  12.6 
Congo  5.2 6.0 8.5 10.2 
Equ.  Guinea  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Benin  3.8 4.4 6.3 7.6 
Mali  3.2 3.7 5.3 6.3 
Tanzania 47.7  8.6  12.3  14.7 
Burkina Faso  6.4  7.4  10.6  12.6 
Mozambique  10.6 12.3 17.6 21.1 
Niger  2.4 2.8 4.0 4.8 
Nigeria  90.4  104.4 149.6 179.0 
Guinea  4.6 5.3 7.6 9.0 
Rwanda  0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Uganda  3.3 3.9 5.5 6.6 
Zambia 6.4  7.4  10.6  12.6 
Botswana  1.1 1.2 1.8 2.1 
Liberia  11.8 13.7 19.6 23.6 
Namibia  1.6 1.8 2.6 3.0 
Ethiopia  11.8 13.7 19.6 23.6 
Gambia  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Ghana  11.7 13.6 19.4 23.2 
Guinea  13.4 16.4 22.1 28.6 
Kenya  2.6 3.0 4.3 5.1 
Malawi  23.8 27.6 39.6 47.2 
Sierra  1.6 1.8 2.6 3.0 
Ivory  Coast  162.7 176.3 252.6 302.3 
Madagascar  36.2 40.7 58.3 69.8 
Togo  1.1 1.2 1.8 2.1 
Senegal  4.4 5.1 7.3 8.7 
Somalia  1.5 1.8 2.6 3.0 
Zimbabwe 6.4  7.4  10.6  12.6 
Gabon  3.3 3.9 5.6 6.6 
Sudan  40.4 46.7 66.9 80.0 
Zaire  53.2 61.4 88.0 105.3 
TROPICAL 
AFRICA 
558.3 653.9 937.1 1121.3 
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III 
The Way Forward: Sustainable Development with Equity in Africa 
African Capabilities 
  Faced with the disheartening trends outlined in the last section, one reaction in the policy 
circles internationally has been to write Africa off as a lost cause.  A somewhat different response 
by the multilateral development agencies has been to advocate structural adjustment according to 
“the Washington Consensus.”  Here I would like to advance a third way of dealing with the 
African crisis.  This alternative is based on an ecologically sound and equitable growth-oriented 
program for the African economies in the future. 
  The philosophical starting point in this approach to African development is the idea of 
human development as an increase in the capabilities of people.  The question one has to pose at this 
point is simply this: What kind of adjustment is an equitable adjustment?  Traditionally, economists have been 
reluctant to answer this question except in very weak normative terms.  The ordinal approach only considers Pareto 
improving allocations where at least one individual is better off and no one else is worse off than before as a 
superior outcome.  The stronger normative approach is to take a utilitarian cardinal social welfare function and use 
some proxy for distributive justice as an argument in this function.  For example, the distribution of income can be 
such a proxy variable.  Many of the indexes of income inequality (e.g. Gini index, Atkinson index, Theil index, 
etc.) and poverty can be derived from such considerations.  The Human Development Index (HDI) is computed 
according to a methodology which uses an income adjusting method in the spirit of Atkinson.  The attraction of 
this method is considerable and I see nothing wrong with using it imaginatively as the HDI approach tries to do.
16
 
22    At the same time, the theoretical criticisms by Sen
17 ; Nussbaum
18 and others that this approach reduces 
all qualities into quanta of utilities is a serious one.  Nussbaum
19 gives a graphic example of this by quoting the 
exchange between Mr. Gradgrind, economist and grief-stricken father, and his pupil Bitzer.  Bitzer outdoes his 
mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality that cannot comprehend a father's grief.  I have pursued 
a similar line of criticism in a number of recent papers.
20
 
  In discussing equity, therefore, I wish to take a version of the social capabilities approach.  Structural 
Adjustments in order to be defensible, must be proven to be capability enhancing, or at least not to be 
capability-reducing.  The first type of SAPs I will characterize as "strongly equitable" SAPs (SESAPs).  The 
second type will be called weakly equitable SAPS (WESAPs).  But first we need to ask:  what is meant by 
capabilities? 
 
 Capabilities  can  be  construed as general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, 
maintained, nurtured and developed.  They can also (under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe 
confinement) be diminished and even completely lost.  I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social (not 
merely biological) character of these human capabilities.




Assessment of SAPs from a Capability Perspective 
  In order to assess SAPs from a capabilities perspective we need to go further and try to describe more 
concretely what some of the basic capabilities may be.  David Crocker has given an admirable summary of both 
Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay.  Mainly relying on Nussbaum,
23 but also on other 
23  sources (shown below), he has compiled a list that is worth reproducing here: 
 
  Basic Human Functional Capabilities (N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen", respectively; the quoted 
items come from Nussbaum
24 unless otherwise noted). 
 
1. Capabilities  in  Relation to Mortality 
  1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, so far as is possible"
25
  1.2. N: Being able to be courageous
26
 
2. Bodily  Capabilities 
  2.1.  N and S: "Being able to have good health."
27
  2.2.  N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished."
28
  2.3.  N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter"
29
  2.4.  N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction" 








4. Cognitive  Virtues 
  4.1.  N: "Being able to use the five senses" 
  4.2.  N: "Being able to imagine" 
  4.3.  N: "Being able to think and reason" 
  4.4.  N and S: "Being acceptably well-informed"
32
 
5.  Affiliation I (Compassion) 
  5.1.  N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" 
  5.2.  N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude" 
   
6.  Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency) 
  6.1.  N: "Being able to form a conception of the good"
33
           S: "Capability to choose"
34 ; "ability to form goals, commitments, values"
35
  6.2.  N and S: "Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life"
36
 
7.  Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice) 
  7.1.  N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings,    
   to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction" 
  7.1.1.  N: Being capable of friendship
37
24
              S: Being able to visit and entertain friends
38
   7.1.2.  S: Being able to participate in the community
39
  7.1.3.  N: Being able to participate politically
40 and being capable of justice
41
 
8. Ecological  Virtue 
  8.1.  N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature" 
   
9. Leisure 
  9.1.  N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities" 
  
10. Separateness 
  10.1.  N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's 
  10.2.  N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context" 
  
11. Self-respect 
  11.1.  S: "Capability to have self-respect"
42
  11.2.  S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame"
43
 
12. Human  Flourishing 
  12.1.  N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural    
         possibilities"
44
  12.2.  S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings"
45
 
To facilitate this ordering, it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to "infuse" but not 
"organize" the other virtues.  Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with Sen's.  Sen's and Nussbaum's 
lists differ at a few points.  For Sen, the bodily capabilities and functionings (2) are intrinsically good and 
not, as they are in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental means to other (higher) 
goods.  In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes between bodily functionings that are chosen 
and intentional, for instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form part of a 
reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as digestion and other "functioning of the 
bodily system in sleep."  She may want to say that intentional bodily actions that lead to being 
well-nourished and healthy are intrinsically good, but that being healthy or having good digestion are not 
functionings (because not intentional) and are valuable only because of what they enable us to do.  
Another option open to her would be to adopt Sen's view that bodily states and processes, whether 




  Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items 5 and 8-10, for which Sen has no counterparts.  These 
items are welcome features.  Item 8, which I have called "ecological virtue", is an especially important 
recent addition to Nussbaum's outlook.  In a period when many are exploring ways of effecting a 
convergence between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is important that an essentially 
anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for other species and for ecological systems.  Worth 
considering is whether Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough.  Perhaps it should be 
formulated to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and nature as 
intrinsically valuable."  Item 9 injects some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the 
 "spirit of seriousness."  What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's list, their absence on 
Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions?  
One hypothesis is that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention, in her Level 1, to the 
limits, vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence.  Further, it may be that Nussbaum's richer 
conception of human beings derives from making use of the story-telling imagination far more than the 
scientific intellect."
46  On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-respect, a virtue that 
enables him to find common ground with Rawls and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, 




  Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct and of central importance.  
One cannot easily trade off one dimension of capability against another.  At most, one can do so in a very limited 
way.  They cannot be reduced to a common measure such as utility. 
 
  As Crocker points out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights and justice going far beyond 
simple distribution of income considerations.  If one accepts the capability approach as a serious foundation for 
human development,
48 then it follows that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation 
of the impact of economic policies.  
 
  In evaluating SAPs from this perspective not only do we wish to pose the question of efficiency but also 
the whole set of questions regarding human freedom.  In particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do 
certain things.  Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by itself would mean very little if it led to a 
lopsided distribution of benefits.  Worse yet, if SAPs led to phenomena such as reduced life expectancy, increased 
unemployment, reduced consumption levels for many and deprivation for certain groups such as women and 
minorities then they will not even be WESAPs.  On the contrary, they will be strongly inequitable from the 
capability perspective. 
 
26    This abstract discussion actually has direct relevance for the African situation.  Unless an alternative is 
found, the future capability enhancement of Africans cannot be assured.  This assessment follows in a transparent 
way from the evidence presented in the previous section. 
 
An Alternative Structural Adjustment Program (ASAP) for Capability-enhancement in Africa 
 
 
  Let us go back to the beginning and reconsider the Washington consensus outlined in section I.  In light of 
what I have said so far it must be apparent that I do not consider this approach to be so much wrong as incomplete 
and to some extent inconsistent with the goals of human development.  I have given critical and technical analysis 
of these programs elsewhere.
49  At the risk of distortion by leaving out some details and nuances I will attempt a 
quick summary here. 
 
  Basically, the conventional SAPs focus on short to medium run results regarding inflation and 
balance-of-payments equilibrium.
50  In the case of many African economies, as discussed in section I, privatization 
itself may have become a goal for structural reform.  Likewise, market-making can also become a goal in itself.  
Not enough recognition has been accorded to the economic side effects such as unemployment or (at least a 
temporary) lowering of output.  Social dimensions of adjustment came to be recognized even later.  The status of 
vulnerable groups such as women, children, or the poor do not often figure explicitly in these programs.  In order to 
design a capability-enhancing alternative SAP (ASAP) for Africa the following elements must figure prominently: 
 
(1)  A clear recognition of the status of the different socio-economic groups in African countries in terms of 




(2)  A list of priorities in terms of economic and social goals must be prepared.  In the case of incompatibilities 
of some of these goals, the question of trade-offs must be raised and resolved explicitly rather than 
implicitly through the logic of the market. 
  
(3)  In particular, issues of fair inter-regional allocation of resources or opportunities must be addressed 
explicitly. 
 
(4) Human  development  indicators based on the capability framework must become an integral part of 
ASAP. 
 
(5)  As table 9 shows, the record of Africa in the wake of SAPs with regards to gender disparities is not 
flattering.  Therefore, gender-justice must become a central part of ASAP for Africa -- not a peripheral 
issue to be ignored or to be resolved later after enough growth has taken place. 
 
(6)  As alluded to in the discussion of African environment, sustainable development, with ecological effects 
of adjustment included, must become the conceptual center of thinking about SAPs in these economies. 
 
(7)  It follows then that ecological and distributional issues need to be explicitly addressed in any such 
program.  This implies that there will be a need for careful inter-disciplinary studies on probable impacts 
of a policy package before its implementation.  It also implies the need for follow-up studies in order to 
assess the after-effects of a SAP.
51
 
  It should be clear by now that no African economy has been provided with an opportunity to design a 
SAP with the above provisos in mind.  However, that does not mean that it is impossible or unrealistic to try to do 
so.  For example, the struggle of Ghana to manage its economy while keeping the goals of creating social 
capabilities may offer some lessons -- positive and negative -- in this respect. 
 
28  Table 9: Critical Gender Disparities in Developing Countries 
 










and managers (% 
female), 1980-89 
parliament (% of 
seats by women), 
1992 
Swaziland    400 52     
Lesotho     350 79     
Zimbabwe    330   15  12 
Congo  63 900  64    
Cameroon  64 550  43 6  12 
Kenya    400 67    3 
Namibia    400 32    7 
Madagascar  83 600  67    
Ghana  73 700  67 9  8 
Zambia  80 600  67 33 3 
Nigeria  65 750  49   2 
Zaire  73 700  56   5 
Senegal  48 750  35   12 
Liberia  58 600  45   6 
Tanzania    600 92    11 
Equa. Guinea    800 56     
Sudan  28 700  41   5 
Burundi  66  800 113   10 
Rwanda  58  700 117   17 
Uganda  56 700  69   13 
Benin  50 800  32   6 
Malawi    500 104   12 
Mozambique  47 800  92   16 
Cen.  Aft.  Rep.  48 650  89   4 
Ethiopia    900 69     
Djibouti   740    0 
Guinea-Bissau  48 1000  72   13 
Somalia  39 900  64    
Gambia  41 1000  69 15 8 
Mali  59 850  19   2 
Chad 43  800  20    
Niger  85 850  89   6 
Leone  35 1000  43    
Burkina  Faso  32 750  96   3 
Guinea  37 1000  43    
      
 
 
Judged by the evidence presented in the previous section, it would appear that SAPs in 
29  Africa over the past decade led not to even a weak equity for the great majority of the population. 
The conditions of the vulnerable groups, in particular of women and children, have worsened in 
many areas.  Inequality and poverty have also increased.  On the strength of the empirical evidence, 
the current international economic policy towards Africa must be declared strongly inequitable. 
  If the current conditions in Africa send a strong message that existing adjustment efforts 
are not appropriate.  What then are appropriate policies consistent with the new approach outlined 
above? 
  In the light of the above criteria for ASAP alternative policies for Africa must address 
initially debt rescheduling, canceling and refinancing.  Specifically, the creation of a multilateral 
debt facility for the highly indebted poor and some highly indebted middle income countries 
would be a step in the right direction.  The World Bank, the IMF and the group of creditor 
countries known as the Paris Club, recently approved a plan to relieve the massive debt load of 
some of the world’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs).  The countries to be assisted under 
this program are those that have undertaken economic reforms but still have extremely high levels 
of external debt relative to their export earnings. 
  Officials of the World Bank and the IMF have said that eight countries would probably 
benefit in the first round of debt relief, and perhaps twelve others might qualify in the future.  The 
first beneficiary is likely to be an African country--probably Uganda.  In Table 10 of the eight 
HIPCs listed six are African countries.  
30  Table 10: External Debt of Selected HIPCs in 1994 
     
Country  Annual Per Capita 
GNP (in US dollars) 
Debt as Percentage of 
GNP 
Debt as Percentage of 
Exports 
Debt Service as 
Percentage of 
Exports 
Bolivia 770  89.4  390.1  28.2 
Ethiopia 100  109.8 630.0  11.5 
Mali 250 151.8  589.2  27.5 
Mozambique 90  450.4  1,388.7  23.0 
Nicaragua 340  800.6 2,286.1  38.0 
Tanzania 140  229.5  877.5  20.5 
Uganda 190  88.1 1,042.7 45.6 




1,090 37.6 162.8 16.6 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1996 
 
 
  While a step in the right direction, this scheme is far from adequate.  HIPCs have 
debt-to-export ratio of over 500 percent as a group.  For some African countries such as 
Mozambique, it is over 1000 percent.  However, there are more than half a dozen other African 
countries with debt-to-export ratios of over 200 percent.  From an economic point of view, a ratio 
of over 100 percent means that export earnings by themselves can not cover the debt during the 
relevant economic period—usually the fiscal year.  Given the argument developed here, debt relief 
needs to be extended to most if not all of these African countries.  The proposed relief for HIPCs 
is estimated to cost between $5.6 billion and $7.7 billion.  The Paris Club countries can offer up to 
80 percent reduction of eligible bilateral debt; the World Bank, African Development Bank and 
other multilateral development banks and individual countries (most notably U.S., UK, and 
France) could contribute to the trust fund to purchase the additional outstanding debt.  Finally, the 
IMF could contribute to the proposed expanded initiative by allocating more funds to its existing 
subsidized loan facilities.  However, in the case of IMF not realizing the stringent conditionalities 
31  will mean that most African countries, as in the recent past, will be unable to use its SAF or ESAF 
facilities.  Additionally, the IMF could also allocate special new SDR’s to the severely indebted 
African countries. 
  In this context, a new contract more generous than the Naples Terms for bilateral debt 
relief is clearly called for.  Partly because of the stringent conditions of Naples Terms, for instance, 
Uganda’s debt service was reduced by only 2 percent.  Countries like Zambia now spend thirty 
times more in debt repayments than on education.  In the spirit of Naples Terms, a new bilateral 
debt relief scheme needs to be set up without conditionalities to provide up to 75 percent reduction 
in the stock of bilateral debt of African countries.   
  From the perspective of the African countries, a debtors cartel might have been a strong 
response earlier.  But the time for such radical responses may have passed.  Therefore, incremental 
proposals like the ones above need to be pursued vigorously. 
 
Social Expenditure Conditionality for Africa 
  The best conditionality that the bilateral and multilateral lenders can impose on the African 
counties is a social expenditure conditionality.  This could be a specific African version of the 
global 20:20 proposal as presented in the Human Development Report 1994 and further refined in 
the interagency consultations within the UN system.  According to the 20:20 proposal, the 
developing countries should earmark at least 20% of their national budgets and donor nations 20% 
of their aid budgets for human development expenditures.  These are defined to include primary 
health care, basic education, rural and peri-urban water supply, essential family planning service 
and nutrition programs for the most deprived groups in society. 
32    If implemented in African countries between $5 and $10 billion may become available 
annually for such human development priority expenditures.  It can be expected that in two 
decades (the goal for the world as a whole is to do this in one decade) the now heavily indebted 
African countries could ensure that: 
1.   Everyone will gain access to basic education. 
2.   Everyone will gain access to primary health care facilities and to safe drinking water. 
3.   All children will be immunized, and most childhood diseases eliminated. 
4.   Maternal mortality rates will be halved 
5.   All willing couples will have access to family planning services, and the groundwork will be 
laid for stabilizing the world’s population by 2015. 
6.   severe malnutrition will be eliminated, and moderate malnutrition reduced by half. 
7.   The worst forms of human deprivation will be eliminated through the provision of certain basic 
social services.  Although the proposal does not deal with many aspects of global 
poverty—particularly with employment and income generation—it does contain certain 
attractive features.  For example, it would; 
-Help slow population growth by focusing on universal female education, primary health care and 
other elements of an essential human development program needed to create the underlying 
conditions for declining fertility. 
-Improve the prospects for global human security downstream by eliminating upstream the global 
spread of many dangerous diseases.  For example, AIDS cost $240 billion during the 1980s; 
preventive health care would have cost only a fraction of that. 
-Improve the global environment by addressing some of the worst aspects of the pollution and 
poverty—polluted water, unknown diseases, galloping population growth. 
-Enhance human capital and its competitiveness.  Consequently poor people will be better able to 
use market opportunities.  This will ultimately lead to a greater demand for goods through the 
multiplier effect.  Growth will be affected favorably as well. 
 
  In view of the serious nature of the economic and social crisis in Africa, the compact may 
have to be more than 20:20 if faster progress is to be made.  A 30:30 compact will destroy the neat 
ocular analogy with perfect vision, but will enable the African nations to achieve the human 
development goals outlined above in half the time.  Because of large initial fixed costs of the 
programs and the presence of economies of scale and complementarities an extra dollar after a 
certain initial amount is actually more productive than before.  Therefore, increasing outlays by 
33  only 50% beyond the 20:20 compact will have almost twice the effect.  This is encouraging and 
should prompt some serious thinking about increasing human development related expenditures 
among African and international policy circles. 
  Finally, an Environmental Defense Fund for Africa (EDFA) needs to be set up.  This could 
be facilitated both by the multilateral aid agencies and the developed country donors.  Local 
campaigns to stop environmental deterioration can be supported through this facility as can be the 
NGOs with programs for sustainable development, given the circumstances described earlier in 
Chapter II. 
  Ultimately, the African nations themselves have the primary responsibility in meeting the 
challenges described.  But without coordinated efforts and aid from the advanced industrial 
nations, no policy for sustainable human development can succeed in Africa. 
 
IV 
Rethinking U.S. Economic Policy Toward Africa: Post- Washington Consensus? 
 
A New Vision? 
  In spite of the prevailing gloom regarding Africa among some circles in 
Washington  there  are  some  hopeful  signs.    In  1994,  John  F.  Hicks,  the  then  Assistant 
Administrator of the Bureau for Africa of AID outlined in general the Clinton 
administration’s policy priorities for Africa in following terms:
52
1. to help Africans build stable, honest and democratic governments, including 
stimulating popular participation and full respect for basic human rights; 
34  2. to promote sustainable development through broad-based, equitable economic 
growth, protection of the environment, and slowing down population growth; 
3. to support conflict prevention and resolution; 
4. to provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering and hunger. 
 
  .These goals appear to be very much in line with the basic thrust of the 
argument for extending a responsible helping hand to Africa presented in this 
monograph. The Bush administration has not outlined a fundamental policy shift 
so far. It may be hoped that the progressive thrust can be deepened and pursued 
with vigor since time is running out for Africa. 
  What is more, if pursued adequately, these foreign policy initiatives will work 
as much to the benefit of the U.S common good as to the Africans.  Aside from 
the increase in trade and economic benefits to the U.S. business in the long-run 
a major benefit of stabilizing the African economies will be the corresponding 
increase in the stability of the global economy.  Uncontrolled financial flows 
have already made the interdependent global economy quite unstable.  It is foolish 
to pretend that instability in an entire continent (albeit the least developed 
one) will not have repercussions for the global economy.  One of the key findings 
of recent research on complexities and non-linearities in economic theory is 
35  precisely the possibility of “small” initial disturbances resulting in large and 
prolonged systemic instability.
53  In an uncertain world, it is better to insure 
against the possibility of such as global catastrophe by sending timely and 
reasonable help to Africa.  The alternative is to increase the chances of such 
global financial, economic and environmental crisis. 
  It  may  help  to  concentrate  our  minds  if  we  try  to  imagine  what  a  total  economic 
and environmental collapse of Africa will mean for the rest of the world.  Such 
a collapse will immediately swell the ranks of economic refugees many of whom 
will undertake journeys to the affluent countries against all odds.  The financial 
collapse, as alluded to before, will lead to near-panic situations in the world 
financial market.  The consequences are incalculable—but it is safe to assume 
that they will not be pleasant for the developed economies either. 
  Perhaps, the greatest threat to the world from a possible catastrophe in 
Africa is to ecology of the planet as a whole.  Although precise estimates are 
hard to come by, ultimately deforestation and other environmental disasters in 
Africa  will  definitely  constitute  to  global  warming,  global  atmospheric  conditions, 
and other global ecological problems. 
  Helping Africa is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian concern.  It is 
dictated  by  a  deep  realism  in  international  economic  relations  based  on  enlightened, 
36  long-term national interests of developed nations such as the U.S.. 
 
Need for Specificity 
  If the general rhetoric from official Washington is modestly encouraging, 
the action so far has been less so.  As George Shepherd has pointed out; 
what is missing..is..the extent of the new commitment to the African region 
which must be on a priority par with other major regions in the world such 





  Addressing the economic issues concretely, based upon the requirements of 
sustainable human development for Africa, will mean a number of significant 
departures and new initiatives on the part of the U.S..  These initiatives must 
range from debt-relief to aid for improving human well-being and the environment 
in Africa.  Without unnecessarily repeating the previous discussion, a set of 
specific economic policies for the U.S. consistent with the analysis so far can 
be outlined. 
 
Some Specific Recommendations: A New Economic Partnership with Africa 
1. The U.S. should immediately endorse and help African nations implement the 
20:20 plan of action.  The Sub-Saharan countries have already accepted the 
37  20:20 plan.  The U.S. can help by both material assistance and by playing a 
leading role that will motivate other donors (in particular Japan) to follow. 
2. The independence and integrity of U.S. economic assistance programs can be 
maintained only if there is an independent agency staffed by dedicated 
professionals who can formulate and help implement the necessary programs 
working with their African counterparts. 
3. In this context, the role of people-to-people contact through the NGO’s needs 
to be made an integral part of the U.S. aid policy for Africa.  The recent 
proposal advanced by NGO groups such as the Development Gap and Friends of 
the Earth-U.S., among others, calls for an independent agency to be created. 
 Furthermore, according to this proposal, this “Agency for International 
Cooperation” will have room for a Development Assistance Board.  The structure 
and governance of this board should be such that NGOs based among the people 
can get funding for development without political or bureaucratic interference 
from above.  Special emphasis must be given the role of these indigenous NGO’s. 
 Cooperation among domestic and foreign NGO’s for specific and appropriate 
projects in Africa could considerably brighten the prospects for genuine 
development there.  A related policy issue here is the possibility of bypassing 
the existing rigid hierarchy of both aid operatives and domestic bureaucracy. 
38   To the extent indigenous traditional sectors will maintain viable 
organizational capacities NGO’s can encourage and foster local self-reliant 
development  by  working  with  the  people  (particularly  in  the  rural  area)  directly. 
 This should also help counter the Afro-pessimism popular among some policy 
circles. 
4. For promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) an FDI board for Africa may 
be set up to work with ECA, ADB and individual African countries to promote 
qualitatively and quantitatively the right kinds of investment in Africa.  
Simply asking African countries to give tax-incentives to the multi-national 
corporations will not be adequate.  Regional integration in Africa will also 
help to attract FDI in the long run. 
5. New aid and investment policies must be connected to a new trade policy towards 
Africa.  Liberalizing the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) under which 
the  industrialized  countries  would  exempt  imports  from  Africa  while  maintaining 
tariffs on imports from other countries, is an urgent task.  The U.S. can take 
a bold step by unilaterally liberalizing its GSP towards indebted African 
countries.  This will generate not only the moral pressure for the other G-7 
countries to follow but will in the meantime confer an advantage to U.S. firms 
trading and investing in Africa.  Even a gradual liberalizing would help 
39  enormously, although progress will be slower than in the case of immediate 
liberalization.  Right now, only about 10% of the dutiable imports from Africa 
receive such preference.  Increasing this to 20% could be a great stride in 
redressing partially the trade problems of many African countries.  On the 
trade front, facilitating moves towards regional integration will be helpful 
for increasing trade within the African countries.  The Africans will have 
to take the major initiative here, but the U.S. can help through providing 
expertise  and  some  resources  for  carrying  on  analytical  studies  and  institution 
building.  ASEAN may be studies as an initial model for the African regional 
economic integration. 
6. On the environmental front, the U.S. can mobilize funding and international 
support for creating EDFA.  A joint U.S.-Japan initiative with adequate funding 
for sustainable development in Africa is likely to generate further support 
among the G-7 nations.  Here, too, the NGOs need to be brought in as equal 
partners right from the beginning of the process. 
7. U.S. economic assistance policy needs also to be geared towards helping the 
small producers through providing funds and expertise (where such expertise 
cannot be provided domestically by the African countries themselves) to foster 
and sustain rural credit unions of the Grameen Bank variety. 
40  8. On the technological front, the U.S. can help by financing and arranging for 
granting African NGOs access to the global communications networks. 
 
  As George Shepherd has pointed out accurately: 
“Rather than retreat from Africa, the United States should form an international partnership 
with African states in their determined struggle against underdevelopment and to enhance 
the dignity of all peoples on this troubled continent. African advancement assures our own. 
By helping them to strengthen their human rights conditions we reaffirm our commitment 




  The eight concrete policy initiatives outlines above are some of the most 
important and immediately feasible steps that the U.S. can take.  The list is 
not meant to be exhaustive.  It is my hope that by focusing on the most urgent 
tasks, it will be possible to persuade the U.S. policymakers to move quickly in 
the desired direction.  At the same time, this monograph can serve as a basis 
for  further  discussion  and  refinements  of  specific  policies.    The  economic  problems 
of Africa are not just African problems.  They are global in their origin and 
scope.  They also will require global cooperation for their solution.  This is 
the basic message of this monograph. 
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Appendix. IMF and World Bank Adjustment Approaches: Stylized Descriptions 
 
 
  Since both the IMF and the World Bank have been so influential in designing many aspects of the 
structural adjustments in both LDCs and transitional economies, it is useful to present in a stylized way the formal 
structures of their approaches.  Needless to say the equations described below cannot capture all or even most of 
the details of SAPs. What they can do is to bring out the formal logic of the conventional thinking which is often 
implicit in the arguments and the policy advice given by these international bodies.  The hope here is to generate a 
rigorous discussion about the issues by clarifying the basic logical structure of the standard SAPs. 
 
The Theoretical Basis of Adjustment Programs 
 
Why the IMF does what it does 
 
  The theoretic basis of IMF adjustment programs rests on financial programming, the analytical 
foundations of which are drawn from Polak
56 and Robichek.
57  The modeling process is referred to as financial 
programming, an integration of monetary and credit elements in BOP analysis, which derives a linkage between 
the domestic part of the money stock (credit) and international reserve changes.  This approach begins from the 
simple accounting identity showing change in the money stock as the result of changes in its domestic and 
international components. 
 
  In the approach the BOP is shown as the difference between the change in money supply and that in 
domestic credit.  The absorption approach is adopted to include income and expenditure relationships as well as the 
impact of capital movements in an open economy.  In this approach the current account (CA) deficit is equal to the 
difference between income (Y) and absorption (A).  The current account is matched by changes in  the net foreign 
assets of domestic banks ( R) and in the net foreign indebtedness of nonbank residents ( FI).  Hence:  Δ Δ
 
 CA  =  Δ R - Δ FI                                  (1) 
 
Combining the current account identity with equation (1) yields 
 
 CA  +  Δ FI = Δ M - Δ D                    (2) 
 
where  M is the change in the money supply and  Δ Δ D is the change in net domestic assets of banks (credit).  
This equation can be written in terms of the difference between nominal income and absorption, as 
 
  Y - A +  FI =  M -  D                (3)  Δ Δ Δ
 
Assuming that the change in nominal money balances are independent of Δ D, the conclusion is that a ceiling for 
D will determine the balance of payments ( Δ Δ R). 
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  To specify where the improvements in the balance of payments will take place, the BOP is decomposed 
 into its different parts and the demand for imports added as a second behavioral relationship.  The simplified 
framework shows imports as a constant function of only real income. 
 
  The BOP identity is 
 
  R = X - IM +  FI                          (4)  Δ Δ
 
where X and IM are exports and imports, respectively, in domestic currency.  Based on projections of the values 
for exports and capital flows, the targeted value of imports is derived as a residual of the preceding equation 
 
 IM
* =  R Δ
* - ( X  + ΔF I)                  (5) 
 
where IM
* is the targeted value of imports, Δ R
* the targeted BOP in the program period, X and Δ FI are the 
projected values of exports and capital flows, respectively. 
 
  To include elements of fiscal policy, three ex-post identities are specified.  Initially, the change in net 
foreign indebtedness of a country is taken as the sum of changes in the public sector ( FI Δ g) and private sector 
( FI Δ p) net foreign debt position: 
 
  FI =  FI Δ Δ p +  FI Δ g                          (6) 
 
Next the public and private sector credit changes are decomposed as 
 
  D =  D Δ Δ g +  D Δ p                            (7) 
 
where D Δ g and  D Δ p are changes in credit to the public and private sectors, respectively. 
 
  Third, the government budget constraint is shown through deficit financing by either net borrowing from 
abroad or net borrowing from domestic banks: 
 
  G - T =  D Δ g +  FI Δ g                          (8) 
 
where G is total government expenditure and T is total revenue, with the difference representing the government 
deficit. 
 
  The three equations provide the rationale for restricting government spending, specifically through 
ceilings on domestic and foreign borrowing.  This policy is directed toward two consequences of government 
spending: fiscal deficits and crowding out. 
 
  In the financial programming framework, the exchange rate plays a role through the effects on money 
demand.  Depreciation of a fixed exchange rate results in a decline in real absorption by creating excess demand 
for real cash balances.  At the same time, by affecting the incentives to domestic supplier of exports and import 
substitutes and spending on exportables and imports, it affects the composition of domestic expenditure on 
43  domestic and foreign goods. 
 
The World Bank’s Model 
 
  Unlike the Fund's concern with temporary BOP imbalances, the World Bank focuses on the real 
economy and growth in the medium term.  Through the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM), it 
emphasizes savings, capital inflows, and investment.  According to Khan,
58 the RMSM posits four additional 
relationships to those in the IMF model. 
 
  Assuming that an incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) is given historically or technologically, output is 
specified as a function of the level of investment: 
 
  y Δ
* = ρ
-1Δ k                             (9) 
 
where  y Δ
* is the output target, ρ  is ICOR, and Δ k is total domestic investment.   
 
  In the model, exports are exogenously determined, although this is later relaxed, and there is a stable 
relationship between GDP and imports.  The savings rate is also stable and historically given, yielding a 
consumption function such as 
 
 C p = (1 - s) (y
* -   )                (10)  ∃ T
 
where Cp is private sector consumption, s is the ratio of private savings to disposable income, and   is taxes.  ∃ T
 
 For  output  determination the national income identity is written as 
 
  K = s(y -  - C Δ ∃ T p) + (  -  ∃ T ∃ C G) + (Z - X)       (11) 
 
where CG is public sector consumption, Z is foreign sector revenues in the form of imports by the domestic 
economy, and X is foreign sector spending on domestic exports.  More importantly, the national income identity 
may be formulated as 
 
  K = s(y Δ
* -  ) + (  -  ∃ T ∃ T ∃ C G) + (ay
* -  X )         (12) 
 
which establishes a positive relationship between income and investment through the aggregate demand curve.  A 
rise in output increases both domestic savings according to given rate, s, and the inflow of foreign saving according 
to the marginal propensity to import, a.  Investment increases in respect to saving on a one-for-one basis. 
 
  The positive relationship between investment and output can also be obtained by rewriting equation (9) as 
 
  K = y Δ
* - y-1,                              (13) 
 
44  where y-1 is last period's real GDP.  In this model, output and BOP targets can be reconciled either through control 
over net capital inflows or though perfect elasticity of foreign capital.  In this way change in net foreign assets 
( F), as a policy variable, can be chose as  Δ
 
  =  Δ ∃ F X  - ay
* -  R Δ
*,                            (14) 
 
where  R Δ
* is a BOP target.  The values of Δ y
* and Δ R
* can be attained through CG,  , and  , given an 
exogenously derived export projection. 
∃ T Δ ∃ F
 
  The World Bank model provides for exchange rate adjustment too.  Including the effects of the exchange 
rate on imports and exports, equation (14) can now be written as  
 
  = -ay Δ ∃ F
* + (b + c) ê -  R Δ
*,                    (15) 
 
where b is a parameter that measures the responsiveness of the volume of imports to the relative price of 
importables, c is the coefficient of responsiveness of exports to relative prices, and e (with the assumption of 
constant prices) is the real exchange rate.  With three independent exogenous variables and eqations to solve three 
endogenous variables, the model is fully determined now, even with a foreign exchange constraint. 
 
Critical Voices Against Adjustment Models 
 
  The criticisms against the IMF and World Bank approaches are numerous and come from several 
directions, from different strands of economists and political scientists.  Therefore, we can attempt only a summary 
here by concentrating on the economic and political economy components of the debate.  However, even these are 
impossible to present in their entirety.  The structuralist challenge is particularly interesting.  Structuralists draw 
attention to institutional and technological factors that affect changes in the economy at any particular time.  The 
neo-structuralists argue that developing countries may respond to standard economic policies unexpectedly.   
Therefore, a devaluation may cause output contraction, tight money may cause price rises due to higher interest 
costs, inflation may become "inertial," and public investment may crowd in, instead of out, private investment.  In 
the long run, they observe that income distribution may condition growth and market liberalization, and unfettered 
foreign capital flows may not be beneficial. 
 
 In  Taylor's
59 theoretical analysis, the trade-liberalizing aspects of the IMF and World Bank models are 
questioned.  It is shown that export subsidies unambiguously increase capacity utilization, and with appropriate 
multiplier values and intermediate import content of output, the trade balance improves as well, without unpleasant 
side effects on interest rates and inflation.  In the short run, liberalization can be self-defeating by liquidating wealth 
and inducing recession.  The long-run consequences can be counterproductive too.  His general conclusion is that 
"at least in the short to medium run, directed policy makes sense.  Maneuvers such as quotas and subsidies (or 
multiple exchange rates) and price controls, instead of changes in the exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policy, 
avoid unfavourable economy-wide side-effects." 
 
  On the Left the attack is launched by Onimode.
60  His criticism evolves around the theme that the IMF 
and World Bank address what he refers to as "at best subsidiary or auxiliary structures" (prices, trade, money, and 
45  foreign exchange).  The relevant "fundamental structures" that demand adjustment are those of the capitalist 
international division of labour, of production, consumption, accumulation, technology, and dependency in the 
poor countries.  Hence IMF and World Bank programs operate to aggravate, rather than ameliorate, the 
crisis-generating structures in Africa and other poor countries.  In sum, he argues that BOP disequilibria are 
inevitable in low-income countries because of the combined effects of devaluation, liberalized imports, and the 
withdrawal of exchange controls. 
 
  Several aspects of programs have become controversial even by centrist standards.  The most often 
discussed aspect relates to the social impact of adjustment on the poor and vulnerable.  This concern has pushed its 
way to the forefront of the debate, since the publication by the United Nations Children's Fund of the (UNICEF) 
twin volumes, Adjustment with a Human Face.
61  The volumes draw attention to the disproportionate share of the 
poor and vulnerable, particularly women and children, in the adjustment burden.  Since then a strong "pro-poor" 
theme has developed in the literature.  Publications such as Susan George's A Fate Worse than Debt have 
strengthened this theme.  According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) the standard 
models "not only ignore the human dimension, but also tend to worsen the well-being of large categories of the 
population, especially the poor and vulnerable."  The major cause of this is public sector budget retrenchment, 
which has also strained governments' institutional capacity to the limit. 
 
  Similarly, the models have been criticized for ignoring the impact of reduced real wages on productivity 
and living standards.  In fact, in many low-income countries the centrality given to the BOP is itself wrong, since 
the most important problem is that of falling or inadequate real incomes.  Therefore, if poverty is perceived as the 
main problem, cutting wages of ordinary, low-paid employees to achieve profitability and economic growth is 
unacceptable. 
 
  Critics have also pointed out a problem of economic logic and deflationary bias.  The logical issue has its 
origins in John Stuart Mill's concept of reciprocal demand, elaborated in his Principles of Political Economy.  The 
idea is that the exports of one country are the imports of another; hence the deficits and debts of one are the 
surpluses and credits of another country.  Failure to recognize this is what creates the deflationary bias of the 
standard adjustment modes.  This has also clear Keynesian implications of global deflation under conditions of 
reciprocal lowering of demand. 
 
  Finally, a note on devaluation, which apart from distributional issues has received the heaviest barrage of 
criticism: There is a long tradition in the literature on the contractionary effects of devaluation and its failure to 
improve the BOP.  The rationale for devaluation is that there are excessive imports and inadequate exports.  The 
two shortcomings of this approach are that it may ignore the share of debt-service payments in the BOP deficit and 
does not distinguish between essential imports and luxury imports.  Inflation may be caused directly by higher 
import costs and/or a nominal rise in food prices, unleashing demands for higher wages in the industrial sector, 
which, if granted, would lead to higher industrial prices and the need for another devaluation.  Even if the 
inflationary pressures can be controlled, the implicit assumption that the demand and supply of tradables is elastic 
has been widely questioned. 
 
46
  All this is not to deny the need for adjustment in the countries that need it.  The real question has to do with 
the type and purpose of the necessary adjustment.  The criteria for ASAP discussed in the main body of the 
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